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1 Introduction
Interdependence between trade policy and environmental quality is a major topic in both
the fields of international and environmental economics. In many developing countries, a
trade policy such as tariff imposition is frequently used to protect domestic environment
as well as domestic industry. One of the central issues is whether trade liberalization, for
instance tariff reduction, can be compatible with maintaining or improving environmental
quality. We address this issue by using the analytical framework of an international
oligopolistic market.
In general, an importing country imposes a tariff at a higher rate or restricts the
importing of goods when this would harm the environmental quality and human health
in the process of its consumption and waste management. For example, in 2009 the
government of Thailand reduced the tariff rate for materials and parts to equip a the
clean car by 90 percent1. The Chinese government also imposed a tariff at a relatively low
rate for some parts of wind power generation2.
Among the wide range of environmental problems facing developing countries today,
it is feared that electronic waste (e-waste) such as mobile phones and PCs will dam-
age the environment and human health since it contains harmful metals. Widmer et al.
(2005) pointed out that a substantial increase in e-waste induces serious environmental
and health damage in countries with rapid economic growth, such as China and India. Al-
though effective countermeasures for e-waste management have introduced the principle
of product liability, its enforcement may be difficult for many developing countries due to
administrative reasons.
One difficulty with waste management arises from the lack of relevant management
technology. In many developing countries, low-skilled waste management technology
harms both the health and environmental quality. However, introducing advanced tech-
nology may be difficult for developing countries, since many of them face other serious
problems apart from waste management. Thus, their governments may not be able to de-
vote resources necessary to mitigate the damage arising from waste emission due to budget
constraint. In such a situation, tariff imposition is preferred over introducing highly skilled
technology in order to mitigate the damage from waste emission since the government can
obtain revenue from the tariff.
This paper considers the effects of technology transfer for waste management on welfare
of the countries engaged in trade. By using the framework of a familiar strategic trade
model with imperfect competition, such as that propounded by Brander and Spencer
(1985), we consider the relationship between an incentive behind technology transfer and
tariff reduction. If advanced technology for waste management owned by developed coun-
tries is transferred to a developing country, a latter may reduce the tariff and as a result,




expect that technology transfer will induce a tariff reduction, then such transfer may be
undertaken voluntarily by the exporting countries.
In a later section, it will be shown that technology transfer from the exporting countries
to an importing country induces tariff reduction. In addition, we will show that the export-
ing country has an incentive to transfer technology voluntarily. In this sense, the solution
to environmental problems promotes trade liberalization. Of course, much literature has
focused on the effects of trade policy on environmental quality, which is assumed to have
transboundary properties (e.g. Kennedy, 1993; Barrett, 1994 and 1997). An interesting
result of this study is that the exporting countries have an incentive to transfer technology
even though the damage arising from waste management in the importing country does
not spill over onto the exporting countries3.
In the real world, however, technology transfer or financial aid seem not to be active
in the field of waste management. We will show that the level of voluntary technology
transfer is inefficiently low. The reason for this is that the tariff imposed by the importing
country has a property of the public bads for the exporting countries. This means, a tariff
reduction resulting from technology transfer by one exporting country benefits the other
exporting countries. Thus, all exporting countries have an incentive to free-ride. As a
result, only the country having the largest market share within the group of the exporting
countries provides technology transfer. Therefore, a non-cooperative solution has certain
limitations.
We also consider the effects of a change in market competitiveness on the level of
technology transfer and national welfare. In the standard model of strategic trade pol-
icy, such as Brander and Spencer (1985), an increase in the number of the firms in an
oligopolistic market benefits the importing country by reducing the distortion caused by
imperfect competition. Therefore, an increase in the number of firms provides an incen-
tive for the importing country to reduce the tariff. However, if the level of technology
transfer is reduced by an increase in the number of the firms, the importing country may
have an incentive to increase the tariff. In the standard model of strategic trade policy,
an increase in the number of firms in one exporting country will harm another exporting
country through a reduction in the profit of the existing firms4. In this paper, we can
find a situation in which all countries benefit from the increase in the level of technology
transfer induced by an increase in the number of firms of a specific country when the
number of the firms is relatively small.
Our analysis is closely related to the studies in the literature concerning technology
transfer, strategic trade policy and voluntary provision of public goods. Kabiraj and
Marjit (2003) argued that the protection of domestic industry via the tariffs attracts
3 In the literature, Kox and Van der Tak (1996) argued that an international cooperation will be useful
in some situations whereby governments use environmental policy as a strategic trade instrument even if
there are no transboundary environmental externalities. The present study can be regarded as a typical
case of this aspect.
4Schoonbeek and de Vries (2009) focused on the relationship between an environmental policy and
market structure. They argued that the government might induce profitable monopolization by using a
emission tax.
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technology transfer from efficient countries. Hence, committed tariff imposition improves
national welfare. In contrast to their analysis, our results imply that a tariff intended for
the protection of the domestic environment should be altered according to the level of
technology transfer. Stranlund (1996) analyzed the effect of technological aid on welfare
under a situation where two countries non-cooperatively adopt environmental policies; it
was argued that the transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior
abatement.
In the literature concerning strategic trade policy, Lahiri et al. (2002), using a frame-
work of perfect competition, considered the relationship between an optimal tariff and
foreign aid. They argued that a Pareto-efficient outcome is achieved if the foreign aid
takes place in exchange for tariff reduction in the recipient country. Their analysis is sim-
ilar to our results such that foreign aid (transfer) should be implemented before choosing
a tariff to improve welfare. However, the driving force behind voluntary transfer in our
framework is pure profit for the firm that exports the goods to the importing country5.
Thus, as the number of firms increases, the incentive for transferring the technology is lost.
In the context of imperfect competition, Kennedy (1994) and Burguet and Sempere (2003)
investigate how trade liberalization affects environmental policies using an intra-industry
trade model6.
When we focus on the free riding behavior of the exporting country, our results can be
related to the literature concerning voluntary provision of public goods, such as Boadway
and Hayashi (1999). That is, the result that only the country having the largest market
share contributes the technology transfer can be interpreted as an application of the Olson
and Zeckhauser(1966) theorem. This paper reveals that an import tariff has a property of
the international public bads under certain conditions. Thus our analysis is also closely
related to the literature concerning strategic transfers in the presence of privately provided
public goods (e.g. Buchholz and Konrad, 1995; Buchholz et al. 1997).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a model.
In Section 3, we present a non-cooperative equilibrium and investigate its properties. In
Section 4, we consider the effect of a change in the number of firms on trade liberalization
and on welfare. In Section 5, we extend the basic model and derive some results. Section
6 is the final section presenting the conclusions.
2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of m exporting countries and one importing country. The
index set of the exporting country is denoted by M = {1, ...,m}, where 1 ≤ m < ∞.
5 In a framework of oligopoly, Puller (2006) argued that the interdependence among oligopolistic firms
can mitigate the welfare loss arising from having no regulatory commitment. In the present analysis, if
the importing country commits to an environmental policy taking the form of a tariff, then the welfare is
Pareto-inferior.
6 In a model of international oligopoly for waste, Cassing and Kuhn (2003) considered strategic envi-
ronmental policy under various situations and characterized a globally optimal environmental policy.
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The importing country is indexed by 0. In country j ∈ M there are nj firms producing
homogenous consumer goods. The total number of firms is n =
P
j∈M nj . The index set
of the firms is denoted by N = {1, ..., n}, where m ≤ n < ∞. For j ∈ M , Nj is the
index set of the firms located in country j: N = ∪j∈MNj . For analytical purposes, the
index j ∈M is arranged in decreasing order of the number of the firms operating in each
country: n1 ≥, ...,≥ nm. Let xi, for i ∈ N , denote the quantity of goods produced by firm
i. Thus, the total supply the goods is X =
P
i∈N xi.
We assume that one unit of consumption good generates one unit of waste. However,
consumers in the importing country do not take account of the environmental damage
arising from their consumption. For analytical simplicity, consumer demand in the im-
porting country, which is a function of the market price, is assumed to be linear. The
inverse demand function can be written as follows:
P = a− bX, (1)
where P denotes the consumer price.
In the importing country, the public sector implements waste management. Let g
denote the quantity of waste treated by the government. The cost function of waste
management is represented by C (g, S), where S denotes the level of waste management
technology. It is assumed that C(g, S) is non-decreasing and convex in g and that the
marginal cost of disposal is reduced by an increase of S: ∂2C/∂g∂S < 0. The waste
that is not treated, X − g, causes environmental or health damage to consumers living in
the importing country by H (X − g). The damage function H is assumed to increase in a
strictly convex manner in non-treated waste: H 0 and H 00 > 0. The public sector minimizes
the social cost of the waste, defined as C (g, S)+H (X − g), for a given level of waste and
treatment technology. Thus, we can define the minimum cost function as
D (X,S) = min {C (g, S) +H (X − g)| X and S are given} .
It can easily be verified that ∂D/∂X = H 0 > 0, ∂2D/ (∂X)2 = H 00 > 0, ∂D/∂S =




(∂g/∂X) < 0. In addition, we assume that
the minimum cost function is convex in S: ∂2D/ (∂S)2 > 0. For analytical simplicity, we





where φ (S) is assumed to be a decreasing convex function: φ0 < 0 and φ00 > 0 hold.
At the initial situation, waste management technology is assumed to be S = s0. As
described in the Introduction, we consider a situation in which the importing country
cannot introduce any advanced technology for waste management by itself due to finan-
cial or technical reasons. Thus, S cannot be altered without technology transfer being
undertaken by other countries. The governments of the exporting countries can transfer
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advanced technology for waste management if they intend to do so. Let us denote the
technology transferred to the importing country from the exporting country j as sj . We as-
sume that the level of technology is determined by the sum of contributions improving the
waste management technology by the exporting countries. Thus, the level of technology
after technology transfer is as follows7:




In the exporting countries, each firm produces xi with identical constant marginal cost
c. The profit of the firm is denoted as follows:
πi = (P − c− t)xi, i ∈ N, (4)
where t is a specific form of the tariff imposed by the importing country. For a given
the level of import tariff, each firm maximizes its profit under the Cournout conjecture.
From the profit maximization behavior of firms, quantity of products can be written as a
function of the tariff and the number of firms such that xi = x (t, n)8. Hereafter, we omit
the subscripts distinguishing the firm in cases where no confusion arises. The total output
of the firms is X = X (t, n). It is clear that ∂X (t, n) /∂t = n (∂x (t, n) /∂t) < 09. Since
π = bx2, we can write π = π (t, n) and ∂π (t, n) /∂t = 2bx (∂x/∂t) < 0.
The welfare of the importing country is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and the
tariff revenue minus the social cost of waste management. From (1) and (2), the welfare
of the importing country W0 can be written as follows:
W0 (t, S, n) =
b− φ
2
X2 + tX. (5)
The welfare of the exporting countries is defined as the sum of profits of the firms minus
the cost of technology transfer:
Wj (t, S, nj , n) = njπ − qsj , (6)
where q denotes the unit cost of technology transfer, which is assumed to be proportional
to the level of the technology to be transferred. The world welfare, SW , can be written
as SW =W0 +
Pm
j=1Wj . From (3), (5), and (6), we obtain
7For example, advanced technology may be embedded in equipment and utilities. In this case, total
amounts of such equipment or of utilities transferred to the importing country represent the level of
technology. In another example, developed countries impart advanced technology or knowledge to workers
employed in the waste management sector. In such a situation, the number of workers and managers
receiving training represent the level of technology. In both these examples, additive form of technology
can be appropriate. Of course, in order to capture the characteristics of certain kinds of technology, we
should consider other specifications. We will discuss this issue in the later section.
8 In detail, xi = (a− c− t) / [(n+ 1) b].
9 In detail, ∂X/∂t = −n/ [(n+ 1) b].
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SW (t, S, n) = kX − b+ φ
2
X2 − q (S − s0) , (7)
where k ≡ a− c is assumed to be positive.
Prior to an investigation of the strategic behavior of the governments, we confirm the
first best outcome. Differentiating (7) in t and S, we have the first best level of tariff tOP
and of technology SOP as follows10:
tOP = k
nφ− b







b+ φ (SOP )
¶2
. (9)
Eq.(8) implies that the socially optimal tax can be decomposed into two parts. One is the
Pigouvian tax corresponding to kφ/ (b+ φ). The other that corresponds to−bk/ [n (b+ φ)]
is the corrective device of the imperfect competition.
3 Non-Cooperative Policy Game
In what follows, we consider a policy game consisting of three stages11. At the first stage
of the game, the exporting countries independently and simultaneously choose the level of
technology transfer such as to improve the cost efficiency of waste management in order
to maximize each country’s welfare. At the second stage, the importing country sets the
tariff rate to maximize the domestic welfare. At the third stage, the firms independently
and simultaneously choose their outputs to maximize their profit.
3.1 Non-Cooperative Tariff by the Importing Country
The third stage of the game has already been mentioned in the previous subsection. We
begin with the second stage of the game in which the importing country decides the tariff
under the firms’ reactions. The government of the importing country sets the tariff rate
to maximize its welfare under the given waste management technology. Thus, solving the





⎡⎣ − (b+ φ) φ0 (k − t)











where εφ ≡ (φ0/φ)S and εφ ≡ (φ00/φ0)S under the assumption of φ00 ≥ 0.
11 It should be noted that technology transfer is not implemented if the importing country commits to
the tariff. Under the committed tariff T , since the welfare of the exporting countries can be written as
Wj = njπ (T, n) − qsj , the exporting countries never transfer the waste management technology. As a
result, the tariff with no commitment improves welfare compared with the situation of commitment.
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first-order condition of welfare maximization represented by ∂W0/∂t = 0, we obtain the
optimal tariff as follows:




The second-order condition, ∂2W0/∂t2 < 0, is always satisfied for ∀n12.
In (10), bk/ [(n+ 2) b+ nφ] corresponds to a part of the rent-shifting effect. That is,
if the consumption goods do not bring any negative externality in their use, which means
φ = 0, (10) can be reduced as t∗R = k/ (n+ 2), which is familiar in the literature concerning
strategic trade policy. On the other hand, nφk/ [(n+ 2) b+ nφ] can be interpreted as the
Pigouvian tax. If the number of firms approaches to infinity, the optimal tariff imposed
by the importing country will become t∗P = φk/ (b+ φ) which equals the social marginal
cost of waste management under perfect competition: t∗P = φX. From (10), it can easily








From (10), we obtain the quantity of products at the second stage of the game:











Inserting (10) and (11) into (5), for a given S and n the maximum welfare of the importing
country can be defined as
W ∗0 (S, n) = max
t







12Differentiating (10) with respect to t, we obtain the first order condition as follows:
∂W0
∂t
= ((b− φ)X + t) ∂X
∂t
+X = 0
The second-order condition can be represented by
∂2W0
∂t2












From the envelope property, we obtain W ∗0 /∂S = −12φ
0 (X∗)2 > 0.
Using (11), we have the profit of the firm at the second stage of the game as follows:












φ0 > 0. (14)
It should be noted that a technological improvement in waste management increases the
profit of the firm through a reduction of the import tariff corresponding to the reduction
of the social marginal cost.
In order to further the investigation, we assume that marginal increase in the profit
























> 0. In (15), E(S) can be interpreted as the ratio of
two elasticities. That is, one is φ0/φ = (∂D/∂S) (S/D), which represents the elastic-





(S/ (∂D/∂S)), which is the elasticity of marginal effect of technolog-
ical improvement on the social cost with respect to the waste management technology.
The following lemma describes a sufficient condition for concavity of the profit function.




> 3E (s0)− 1, (C1)
E (S) is a non-increasing function in S. (C2)
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Conditions (C1) and (C2) imply that the absolute value of φ0 is sufficiently small
relative to φ00. For example, if we specify φ (S) as φ (S) = S−γ , then E = γ/ (1 + γ). In
this case, b ≥ φ (s0) is a sufficient for (C1) under the condition of γ < 1/2. Alternatively, if
φ (S) takes the form of φ (S) = e−γS then E = 1. In this case, Condition (C1) is satisfied
if and only if b > 2φ(s0).
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3.2 Technology Transfer by the Exporting Country
We now turn to the first stage of the game. At this stage, the exporting countries simul-
taneously decide the level of technology transfer. The welfare of the exporting country is
represented by (6).




∗ (S, n)− qsj , (P1)
subject to (3) and
sj ≥ 0.











sj = 0. (17)
The second-order condition is satisfied if ∂π∗/∂S is decreasing in S.
Since we assume that the firms are identical in case of their technology, for a sufficiently









− q > 0, j 6= 1. (19)
Thus, we can write the level of technology transfer as a function of the distribution of the
firms among the exporting countries.
S = S (n, q) , (20)
where n = (n1, ..., nm) denotes a vector consisting of the number of firms in each country.
From (18) and (19), the following result can be easily verified:
Proposition 1. At the equilibrium, (i) only the countries having the largest share of goods
in the importing country contribute to technology transfer, and (ii) for a given number of
the firms, the level of technology transfer is increased by an increase in the number of n1.
Proof. Part (i) is obvious from (18) and (19). Part (ii) follows from the concavity of the
profit function π∗ (S, n) in S and (18). ¥
Proposition 1 states that if the number of firms differs across the countries, there exist
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free-riders who enjoy the benefit of tariff reduction without any technology transfer. The
reason why the free-rider emerges at the equilibrium is quite simple. The tariff is imposed
on all the exporting countries at a uniform rate. Thus, a tariff reduction resulting from
technology transfer by one country can benefit all exporting countries. In this sense, the
tariff has a property of a kind of public goods (bads). Hence all exporting countries have
an incentive to free-ride on the technological assistance provided by the other country.
If the exporting countries are perfectly symmetric with respect to the number of firms,
every country may become a contributor of technology transfer13. However, the situation
in which all the exporting countries implement technology transfer is never desirable from
the viewpoint of world welfare. The following is a straightforward application of well-
known results in the literature concerning voluntary provision of public goods14.
Corollary 1. Suppose that all the exporting countries equally share the market of the
importing country: nj = n/m for ∀j ∈M holds. Then all exporting countries may become
the contributors of the technology transfer at which the level of the technology transfer is
the lowest level among any possible distribution of firms.








The claim directly follows from the above expression. ¥
As a result of free-rider problems, it is not always the case that the contributing
country that has the maximum market share obtains the highest level of welfare among
the exporting countries. Welfare of the contributing country can be written as W1 =
n1π
∗ (S∗1 , n)− qs∗1, while welfare of the noncontributing country j can be written as Wj =
njπ
∗ (S∗1 , n), where S
∗
1 = s0 + s
∗
1. Therefore, if the difference in the number of firms
between the contributing country and the noncontributing country j is relatively small
such that (n1 − nj) /n1 < −2φ0s∗1n/(2b + n (b+ φ)), then the welfare of the contributing
country is lower than that of the non-contributing country j15.
Example 1. Consider a numerical example such that m = 3, n1 = 6, n2 = 5, n3 = 4,
b = 3/2, k = 10, φ (S) = e−S , s0 = 0 and q = 1/4. At equilibrium, the level of technology
transfer S∗ = s∗1 = 1.506 and profit of the firm is π
∗ = 0.181. Thus, welfare of the
exporting countries are W1 = 0.707, W2 = 0.903 and W3 = 0.722, respectively. ¤
This result is well-known in the literature concerning voluntary provision of public
goods by governments having different sizes of populations (e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser,
13 In the case of n1 = n2 =, ...,= nk, each country’s contribution is indefinite, but the total contribution
k
j=1 sj is determined according to the first-order conditions represented by nj (∂π/∂S) = q for j = 1, ..., k.
14For example, see Andreoni (1988).
15To derive the inequality, we use the first-order condition n1 (∂π/∂S) − q = 0 and ∂π∗/∂S =
− [2nφ0/(2b+ n (b+ φ))]π∗ obtained from (13) and (14).
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1966; Boadway and Hayashi, 1999).
3.3 Coordination of Tariff and Technology Transfer Policies
The result obtained in the previous subsection indicates that the equilibrium level of
technology transfer is inefficiently low. This inefficiency can be divided into two parts.
One arises from the non-cooperative behavior among the exporting countries. The other
is due to lack of coordination between the exporting countries and the importing country.
Starting from the initial equilibrium characterized by (18) and (19), we consider the
cooperative behavior among the exporting countries. The importing country still sets the
tariff strategically according to (10). Cooperative change in technology transfer of country
j is represented by dsj = δidS where
Pm
j=1 δj = 1. Noting that the initial situation is








Thus, we can consider the cooperative increase in technology transfer to be Pareto-
improving. That is, δi = nj/n1 − εj , εj > 0, and
Pm
j=1 εj = (n− n1) /n1 ≥ 0. As long
as m > 1, this coordinated increase in S is feasible and achieves Pareto-improving such




X2dS. Sequential coordination is also
possible to the extent that n (∂π/∂S) > q holds. Once n (∂π/∂S) = q is achieved, Pareto
improving is impossible as a result of coordination only among the exporting countries.
Now we consider the coordination between the exporting countries and the importing




− q = 0. (21)
That is, we assume that the coordination between the exporting countries and the import-
ing country begins after the coordination among the exporting countries. Welfare effects





















Thus, changes in the tariff and the level of technology transfer that satisfy (nj/n) dt −
(∂t∗/∂S) dsj ≤ 0 and
P
j∈M dsj ≥ 0 improve the welfare in the sense of Pareto.
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4 Market Competitiveness and Welfare
Trade liberalization can be achieved not only by a reduction of the tariff but also by an
enhancement of market openness. In this section, we consider the effect of a change in the
number of firms on the tariff and on national welfare. For analytical simplicity, we assume
that n1 > n2 ≥, ..., nm holds at the initial situation. That is, only one country contributes
to technology transfer initially. In addition, we consider a small change in the number of
firms such that the contributing country is not altered by this change.
4.1 The Number of Firms and Trade Liberalization
In the previous section, it is revealed that technology transfer by the exporting countries
reduces the import tariff. However, the incentive for the exporting country to transfer
technology lies in the pure profit of firms. An increase in the number of firms has two
opposing effects on welfare of the importing country. One is a beneficial effect arising from
an increase in the competitiveness of the market. The other is a harmful effect arising
from a decline in the level of technology transfer since a reduction of the firms’ profits may
lower the incentive behind technology transfer.
First, we consider the effect of the number of firms on the level of technology transfer.
Under a fixed level of the technology transfer, an increase in the number of the firms







As in the standard literature concerning imperfect competition, total output of the firms
increases with increase in the number of firms. On the other hand, under a fixed level of








The above equation implies that the tariff is reduced by an increase in the number of
firms if the marginal benefit of consumption of goods exceeds the marginal damage arising
from waste management at a fixed level of management technology. However, we should
take into account the change in the technology since the level of technology transfer may
change depending on the number of firms.
From (20), change in the level of technology transfer can be written as dS =
Pm



















, j 6= 1. (25)
Thus, we obtain









j=1 dnj . In (26), the first term of the right-hand side is positive from
(14) and the second-order condition for welfare maximization. As shown in Corollary 1,
if the total number of firms does not change, concentration of firms to the contributing
country increases the level of technology transfer. In the second term on the right-hand
side in (26), marginal effect of technology transfer on profit is a decreasing function of
the total number of the firms, since an increase in market competitiveness reduces profit.




nφ+ b (n− 1)
(2b+ bn+ nφ)4
< 0. (27)
Substituting dn1 = 0 into (26), we can verify that an increase in the number of firms in
the non-contributing country reduces the level of technology transfer.
Substituting (14), (15) and (27) into (26), we obtain
dS = φ0
(2b+ nb+ nφ) n̂1 − 2 (n (φ+ b)− b) n̂
∆
, (28)
where n̂1 ≡ dn1/n1 and n̂ ≡ dn/n denote the rate of change in the number of firms in the
contributing country and in the total number of firms, respectively, and
∆ ≡ nφφ00
µ







The last inequality of the above expression follows from the second-order condition for
optimization of the exporting country.
The effect of change in the number of firms on the level of the technology transfer
depends on the country whose number of firms has increased. From (28), we obtain the
following result.
Lemma 2. If and only if the number of firms changes according to satisfying the following
inequality, then the level of the technology transfer is increased.
n̂1 > 2
n (φ+ b)− b
n (φ+ b) + 2b
n̂. (29)
Proof. This is obvious from (28). ¥
Intuitively saying, Lemma 2 states that the level of technology transfer will be increased
if the initial number of firms is small and if an increase in the number of firms occurs
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mainly in the country having the largest share in the importing country. It is clear that
a small increase in the number of firms in the non-contributing country decreases the
level of technology transfer. Since sup{(n (b+ φ)− b) / (n (b+ φ) + 2b)} for n ∈ [1,∞) is
"1", a sufficient condition for Proposition 3 to hold is n̂1 > 2n̂. If the market share of
country 1 is less than 50%, then a small increase in the number of firms in the country
1 increases the level of technology transfer17. It is notable that a proportional expansion
of competitiveness such that n̂j = n̂ for ∀j ∈ M does not always lead to an increase the
technological assistance. From (29), if the initial number of firms is greater than four,
such expansion reduces the level of technology transfer.
Now we consider the effect of change in the number of firms on the import tariff. The
change in the tariff can be represented by the following expression.







The first term on the left-hand side in (30) is negative if and only if b > φ holds. The sign of
the second term depends on the change in the level of technology transfer. In the standard
model of strategic trade policy, which does not take account of waste management, any
increase in the number of firms reduces the tariff, since the rent-shifting effect is decreased
by an increase in competitiveness. In the present model, from (28) and (30), the tariff is
reduced as a result of increase in the number of firms if b > φ and n̂1 > 2n̂ hold. However,












Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Starting from the initial equilibrium, a small increase in the number of










Proof. This is obvious from (31). ¥
Proposition 2 implies that an increase in competitiveness may increase the tariff when
the number of firms increases in the non-contributing countries. As an extreme situation,
suppose that only the number of the firms in the non-contributing country is increased.
That is, n̂1 = 0 holds. From Lemma 2, we can see that the level of technology transfer is
decreased by such a change in the number of firms. Therefore, if
1 + (2n− 1)E > b
φ
,
17Because of n̂ = (n1/n) n̂1 under dn1 = dn, n̂1 > 2n̂ implies n1/n < 1/2. Since production technology
of the firms is symmetric, market share of the country 1, i∈n1 x1/X, is equal to n1/n.
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holds, then the tariff is increased.
An increase in competitiveness represented by an increase in the number of firms has
two effects on the importing country. One is a beneficial effect brought about by increased
consumption of the goods, which is represented by b. The other, which is represented by
φ, is a harmful effect resulting from an increase in waste. An increase in the number of
firms in the contributing country partly mitigates the harmful effect through an increase
in technology transfer when the initial number of firms in the contributing country is
sufficiently small. In contrast, if the beneficial effect is sufficiently small such that b/φ ≈ 1,
then the importing country intends to prevent the trade by increasing the tariff.
4.2 Welfare Effects of Market Competition
We now turn to the effects on welfare. First, we consider welfare of the importing country.
At the non-cooperative policy equilibrium, welfare of the importing country can be written














From (32), it is obvious that welfare is increased by an increase in the number of firms
if the level of technology transfer is increased. More generally, welfare of the importing






n̂+ (n̂1 − n̂)nE > 0. (33)
Eq. (33) implies that if the initial market share of country 1 is sufficiently small, then
welfare of the importing country is improved. In contrast, if the number of exporting
countries is 1, which means n̂1 = n̂, welfare may be improved under a small number of n.
Next, we consider the change in the welfare of the contributing country indexed by 1.
Since we assume that the contributing country does not change before or after the change
in the number of firms ds1 = dS holds. Using the envelope property, we can write the









Obviously, an increase in the number of firms in the own country is a necessary condition
for improving welfare19. After some manipulation, we can verify that if the following
inequality is satisfied, then welfare of the contributing country is improved.











2b+ n (b+ φ)
n̂. (35)
A necessary condition for improving welfare of the contributing country is that the level
of technology transfer due to change in the number of the firms is increased. Therefore,
if the welfare of the contributing country is improved, then the welfare of the importing
country is also improved.

































− 3E + 1
¶ , (37)
where n̂j ≡ dnj/nj . Although (37) seems to be complicated, we can consider some special
situations. First, if both the number of firms in both the contributing country and country
j does not change, the change in welfare of country j can be written as
dWj |dn1=dnj=0 < 0. (38)
On the other hand, if only the number of the firms in the contributing country is increased
the change in welfare can be written as follows:





1−E + (b/φ) . (39)
In (39), (C1) implies 1−E+(b/φ) > 2E. Thus, welfare of the noncontributing country is
reduced if n1/n is greater than 1/2. In contrast, if the number of firms in the contributing
country at the initial equilibrium is sufficiently small, then an increase in the number of
firms in the contributing country can improve the welfare of the contributing country.
From (32), (34) and (39), we have the following result.
Proposition 3. At the initial equilibrium, if the number of the firms in the contributing





1−E + (b/φ) , (40)
then a small increase in the number of firms in the contributing country achieves Pareto-
improvement.
Proof . A sufficient condition for satisfying (35) is n1/n < 1/2. From (29), if n1/n < 1/2
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holds, then dW0 > 0 and dW1 > 0 also hold. In addition, n1/n < 1/2 is a necessary
condition for dWj > 0 for j 6= 1. Therefore, if (40) is satisfied, then dW0 > 0, dW1 > 0,
and dWj > 0 hold. ¥
The condition stated in Proposition 3 tends to be satisfied if the initial distribution of
firms is spread across the countries. For example, suppose that the damage function that
takes a form of φ (S) = e−rS, r > 0, which means E = 1. In this situation (40) implies
1/2 > φ/b > n1/n.
5 Extensions
5.1 Endogenous Timing of the Policy Instruments
Thus far, we assume that the timing of the game is determined exogenously. The results
obtained in the previous section crucially depend on the timing of the game. In this
subsection we consider a game where the timing of the moves is determined endogenously.
We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)20. At the beginning
of the extended game, stage zero, the exporting countries and the importing country choose
independently and simultaneously whether to set a tariff, and the level of technology
transfer at stage one or at stage two. Then, each country sets the policy variable at the
chosen stage. At the third stage, each firm decides its output to maximize the profit.
It is notable that the exporting country has an incentive to transfer technology in
exchange for a tariff reduction. If the importing country chooses the tariff at the first
stage of the game, the exporting country does not transfer the technology. Therefore, the
importing country will decide to choose the tariff rate at stage two. When the importing
country is a second-mover, the exporting country choosing the first move decides the level
of technology transfer according to (P1). Thus, among the exporting countries that choose
the first move, only the country having the largest share contributes to technology transfer.
The exporting countries that have small shares in the market do not transfer technology
even if they decide to become the first-mover.
In order to investigate the behavior of the exporting country, let us denote s∗j as the
level of technology transfer chosen by the exporting country j that becomes the only
contributor.
s∗j = argmaxsj
Wj (S, nj , q) . (41)
From (P1), it can be easily verified that s∗1 ≥, ...,≥ s∗m holds.
Consider a situation in which country j chooses the first move, while the countries
indexed by r(< j) are the second-movers. In this situation country h(> j) is indifferent
20 In the literature concerning strategic trade policy, Collie (1994) and Supasri and Tawada (2007) deal
with the endogenous timing model.
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between the first and the second moves. On the other hand, country r has an incentive to
become a first-mover if the following inequality is satisfied.
W ∗r (s
∗
r)−W ∗r (s∗j) ≥ 0.
In contrast, ifW ∗r (s
∗
r)−W ∗r (s∗j ) < 0 holds, country r remains the second-mover. In general,
the level of technology transfer possible at equilibrium depends on the distribution of firms
among the exporting countries.
Proposition 4. Let us denote Ω as a set of possible levels of technology transfer. If the
following inequalities are satisfied for j ∈M then Ω = {s∗1, ..., s∗j}.
n1






















Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Since s∗j is an increasing function in nj , Proposition 3 states that if the market share
of country 1 is sufficiently large such that (43) holds for j = 2, then the result obtained
in the previous section does not change. On the other hand, if (42) holds for j = m then
every country could be a contributor. That is, there exists an equilibrium in which the
country having the largest share in the market is a free-rider.
5.2 Technology of Waste Management
To derive the results, we assume that the level of technology is additive. In some situations
this setting may not be realistic. For example, the technology to be transferred sometimes
takes the form of intangibles such as knowledge or know-how. Once knowledge is trans-
ferred to the importing country, it flows throughout the country without any learning
cost. Furthermore, even if inferior knowledge is transferred to a country that has already
received an advanced technology, this is not effective in improving the waste management
system.
In this subsection, taking into account the characteristics of such technology, let us
consider a situation in which technology takes the form of best-shot, as propounded by
Hirshleifer (1983)21. That is, (3) is replaced by the following equation.
S = max {s0, s1, ..., sm} . (44)
21See also Sandler (1998).
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As in the previous subsection, from (16) and (17), we can define the level of technology
transfer which maximizes the welfare of the contributing country in the absence of other
countries’ transfer.










Similar to the literature concerning voluntary provision of best-shot public goods, the
equilibrium may not be unique. The following proposition, similar to Proposition 3, implies
that we can not exclude multiple equilibria.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the technology takes the form of best-shot. If the following
inequalities are satisfied for j ∈M , then the number of the equilibria at the first stage of
the game is j.
n1







Proof. A procedure similar to that in Proposition 3 can be applied. ¥
Proposition 5 states that the number of equilibria depends on the distribution of firms
among the exporting countries. As with Proposition 4, if there are sufficiently large number
of firms, the number of the possible equilibria will increase as the distribution of firms
approaches to uniformity.
We can also consider technology taking the form of
S = f (s0, s1, ..., sm) , (45)
and ∂f/∂si ≥ 0, i ∈ {0}∪M . If the technology is specified by (45), two or more countries
might contribute to the technology transfer. However, at the equilibrium the country
having the largest share in the market contributes more transfer of technology as long as
the marginal effects of transfer on the waste management technology do not differ among
countries22.
5.3 Heterogeneity of the Firms
The basic results presented above are still valid if we take account of non-identical pro-
duction cost. Suppose that the profit of the firm i can be written as
22For example, suppose that S = s0Πj∈Msaj for a ∈ (0, 1) and that φ (S) = S. Thus, the first order







For a sufficiently low value of q, at the equilibrium, sj > si > 0 holds if and only if nj > ni for i, j ∈M .
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πi = (P − ci − t)xi. (46)
From the first-order condition for profit maximization, we obtain the output of firm i
as xi (t, n) = (k̂i − t)/ [(n+ 1) b], where ki = a − ci and k̂i ≡ (n + 1)ki −
P
kj . Total




/ [(n+ 1) b], where k̄ ≡ (1/n)
P
kj . Thus, the
optimal tariff to maximize the welfare of the importing country can be written as t∗ (S) =
(b+ nφ) k̄/ [(n+ 2) b+ nφ]. Together with the expressions noted above, the output of firm
i can be written as follows:







Therefore, total output can be written as X (S, n) = k̄/ [(n+ 2) b+ nφ]. Each exporting






π∗i (S)− qsj , (48)
subject to S =
Pm












⎞⎠ sj = 0.









X2θj − q, (49)
where θj ≡
P
i∈Nj xi/X denotes the market share of country j. Therefore, at the equi-
librium, the exporting country having largest share in the importing country becomes a
contributor. Unlike the results in Section 2, market share depends not only on the number
of firms but also on the marginal costs of firms. By using (47), the market share of country









(b+ nφ+ bn) .
Therefore, the difference between the market share of country j and r is
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⎞⎠− b+ nφ+ bn
bn
(nj − nr) . (50)
If marginal costs of the firms are identical, (50) can be reduced as
θj − θr =
1
n
(nj − nr) .
If two countries have the same number of firms, difference in the market share is










Basic results obtained in the previous section will not change even if we allow the difference
in marginal costs. In Section 4 we argued that an increase in the number of firms in the
non-contributing country does not lead to Pareto-improving. In line with this argument,
reduction in the marginal cost of less-efficient firms in the non-contributing country may
have a negative impact on the other countries.
6 Conclusions
This paper considers the effectiveness of international aid for technological improvement
that reduces the damage arising from waste management. We revealed that the exporting
country has an incentive to transfer the waste management technology even if the damage
arising from the waste does not spill over onto the exporting country. Technology transfer
is voluntarily motivated by tariff reduction implemented by the importing country. How-
ever, a non-cooperative solution leads to an inefficiently low level of technology transfer.
Since the benefit of tariff reduction implemented in exchange for technology transfer by
one country spreads among all the exporting countries, every exporting country has an
incentive to free-ride. In this sense, the tariff can be regarded as public bads for the
exporting countries.
Our results also show that the level of technology transfer at the equilibrium depends
on the distribution of firms among the exporting countries. For a fixed total number of
the firms, the level of transfer is increased by concentrating the firms within the con-
tributing country. In practice, the government of the importing country could restrict
the entry of the foreign firms by using non tariff barriers such as quality standards and
other administrative measures. The present analysis suggests that the government may
use discriminative entry regulation as a policy device to improve the welfare. However,
such an entry regulation does not seem to be a desirable policy: the government should
first construct a scheme to mitigate the free-rider problem. We do not address this issue
in the present paper. It shall be pursued in the future.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1


































(3E − 1) .

















= 3E − 1.





> 3E − 1 ≥ n
n+ 2
(3E − 1) .
Thus, the claim of Lemma 1 is proved.
7.2 Derivation of (33)
Substituting (12) (22) and (28) into (32), we have
dW0 =
nk2














2 bφ − nE
´
n̂+ (n̂1 − n̂)nE
´






Since 3E − n+2n
b
φ − 1 < 0 from (C1), we obtain (33).
22
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we define a critical value of technology transfer that distinguishes the contributor




j (nj), n]− qs∗j (nj) = njπj (ŝj , n) . (A3)
If a country other than j contributes s∗r to the technological assistance, country j decides
whether to become a contributor according to s∗r > ŝj . Since ∂πj (ŝj , n) /∂ŝj > 0, we can







j (nj), n]− njπj (ŝj , n)
−nj∂πj/∂ŝj
. (A4)

















πj is an increasing function in s, (A3) and (A4) imply that dŝj/dnj > 0. That is, the
country’s critical value is an increasing function of the number of firms which means that
if country j chooses noncontributor for a given level of s∗r, country j + 1 also chooses the
noncontributor because of s∗r > ŝj > ŝj+1. Next, suppose a situation in which country
r chooses the first move and that countries 1 and j ∈ (2, r − 1) choose the second move.
If (42), which means W ∗1 (s
∗
1) − W ∗1 (s∗r) ≤ 0, holds then country 1 does not have an
incentive to change its timing. This means that country j ∈ (2, r−1) also does not change
the timing. Furthermore, country h(> r) does not contribute regardless of its decision
concerning timing. Thus, if (42) holds for j = r then s∗r ∈ Ω. Next, suppose that country
r + 1 chooses the first move and that country j < r + 1 chooses the second move. In this
situation if (43) holds country 1 has an incentive to change its timing since (43) means
W ∗1 (s
∗
r)−W ∗1 (s∗r+1) > 0. In this case, country r + 1 can not be a contributor. Therefore
if (43) holds for j = r then s∗r+1 /∈ Ω. ¥
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